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CHAPTER THREE

THE INTENTIONALITY STRUCTURE
OF COMPLEMENTARITY

SECTION I: BOHR AND COMPLEMENTARITY

The Copenhagen Spirit
Heisenberg's opposition to wave mechanics did
last long. Influ
enced by Bohr, he came to accept its elegant mathematical methods
- though not Schrödinger's interpretation of them - and also the more
concrete manner of presentation afforded by Bohr's Principle of
Complementarity. In the preface to the lectures he gave at the Uni
versity of Chicago in the spring of 1929 and published under the title
The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory, he speaks of the
"conclusive studies of Bohr in 1927" on the nature of the quantum
theory, and identifies himself completely with the Kopenhagener Geist
der Quantentheorie founded, he says, upon the
equivalence
was born in Copenhagen
of corpuscular and wave concepts".
in 1927", he wrote,
not only an unambiguous prescription for the
interpretation of experiments, but also a language in which one spoke
about Nature on the atomic scale, and in so far a part of philosophy" 1.
Heisenberg's acceptance of wave mechanics as an intrinsic part of the
quantum theory was understandable; but his capitulation to the phi
losophy of complementarity was, in our opinion, unfortunate; for it
led him away from the true sense of his original insight 2.
1 W. Heisenberg, "The Development of the Interpretation of the Quantum Theory" in
Niels Bohr and the Development of Physics, ed. by W . Pauli (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1955),

p.16.
2 It is often said and generally believed that the quantum theory owes its origin and inspi
ration to the spirit of complementarity. On this point, P. K. Feyerabend writes not altogether
unjustly : "The full quantum theory we owe to a metaphysics diametrically opposed to the
philosophical point of view of Niels Bohr and his disciples, viz., to that of Schrödinger. This
is quite an important historical fact as the adherents of the Copenhagen picture very often
criticize the metaphysics of Bohm and Vigier by pointing out that no physical theory has yet
been developed on the basis ... They forget that the Copenhagen way of thinking has not
produced a theory either. What it has produced is the proper interpretation of Schrödinger's
wave mechanics after this theory has been introduced. For it turned out that Schrödinger' s
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Complementarity
The Principle of Complementarity is
a physical principle like the
the Indeterminacy Principle, nor is it a heuristic principle in physics
like the Correspondence Principle; but it is a philosophical (or
epistemological) principle which attempts to explain how we know the
atomic domain and how the inherent limitations of our knowing powers
impede our conception and expression of the intrinsic nature of micro
physical events 1.
In the seven paragraphs immediately following we give our summary
of the philosophy of complementarity with some comments on the
import of the doctrines involved.
(i) The aim of atomic physics is to put order into an increasing range
of our experiences with a view to predicting patterns in these ex
find out the
periences 2. The Galilean and Newtonian aim of trying
truth about the heavens and the earth is to be abandoned for the
reason alleged by Bohr that the interior resources we have for in
vestigating the atomic domain are too modest to allow us ever to reach
such a truth.
(ii) The resources of our knowing powers are limited by the "forms
of perception" 3 which allow us to speak and to describe only (what
we have called) bodies in the strict sense, and to conceive only inductive
generalisations of bodily phenomena. The two kinds of bodies are
particles which are localisable and fields which are non-localisable,
wave mechanics was just that complete rational generalisation of the classical theory that
Bohr, Heisenberg and their collaborators had been looking for and parts, of which they had
already succeeded in developing", in "Problems in Microphysics", Frontiers of Science and
Philosophy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1964), pp. 264-266.
1 References will be made chiefly to the following works of N. Bohr: Atomic Theory and
the Description 01 Nature (Cambridge: 1961), which is a collection of
of Bohr's most
celebrated articles on the interpretation of quantum mechanics published originally between
1925 and 1929, with an introductory survey and commentary by the author written in 1934;
"Can Quantum Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be Complete?", Phys. Rev.,
XLVIII (1936), 696; "On the Notions of Causality and Complementarity", Dialectica, 7/8
(1948), pp. 312-319; "Discussions with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic
Theory", in Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, pp. 199-242. For a detailed
of Bohr's
philosophy of complementarity by a modern philosopher-physicist, of., P. K. Feyerabend,
"Complementarity", in Proc. Aristot. Soc., Suppl. Vol., XXXII (1958), pp. 75-104. It should
be noted that the philosophical doctrine called Complementarity has undergone considerable
evolution, notably on the part of Heisenberg and in a sense away from the predominantly
empiricist spirit of the early phase. For the essentials of what might be called the
physical principles of complementarity, see Concept of the Positron, chaps. VI-VII, by N. R.
Hanson. It is in the sense of Hanson that most physicists belong to the Copenhagen School.
However, there is a big difference between Hanson's summary and the unabridged philo
sophies of Bohr and Heisenberg.
2 Bohr, Atomic Theory etc., pp. I, 12, 16-17, 55, 69, 77, 87.
3 Ibid., pp. 1,5,15-19,22,90-93,96,103, III; Albert Einstein, etc., pp. 209; Dialectica,
p. 313; Pkys. Rev., loco cit., p. 702.
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although a field may give rise to a wave packet of virtually finite
every experience
dimensions. Thus, the forms of perception
and notably those of atomic phenomena by submitting them to a
synthesis in which the velocity of light is represented as infinitely large,
and Planck's constant is represented as vanishingly small!. In other
words, every experience of atomic phenomena is
either as a
particle
as a wave. This is what is meant by wave-particle duality.
This idealisation, however, is due to our forms of perception and is
neither a coherent objective picture of the atomic event taken as a
phenomenon nor does it
us true knowledge of the atomic event
as a reality 2. Bohr was a realist in the empiricist sense; that is, he
held that reality, if it is to be known truly, can be known only in and
through a stable and coherent phenomenal object. ,Since no coherent
phenomenal object can be formed of an atonlic event, he considered
that the atomic event cannot be known as a reality, that is, as it is
in itself.
(iii) The concepts of quantum mechanics are defined in terms of the
concepts of classical physics. These are just refinements of the concepts
of everyday life and refer only to bodies in the strict sense 3.
(iv) Our experience of atomic phenomena occurs within acts of
observation. These involve a union between the knowing subject and
the known object in which no sharp distinction can be made between
them. Moreover, the observing subject disturbs its object in the act
of observing it: the disturbance of
objects is very small,
but in the atomic domain the disturbance is considerable and, moreover,
inescapable, since the subject and the object must share between them
at least one indivisible quantum of energy 4. Hence, our (private)
subjectivity enters essentially and inevitably into our experience of
atomic phenomena. This theory of observation is founded upon what
we shall call the perturbation theory ot measurement. This completes the
two aspects under which our knowledge is non-objective. (The first was
mentioned above in (ii).
,
(v) , A consequence of this is that (bodily or phenomenal) causality
does not hold for atomic phenomena. Hence the statistical laws of the
atomic domain are irreducible 5. Bodily (or phenomenal) causality, it
1

Bohr, Atomic Theory etc., PP 5, 16-17, 22, 66, 116.
pp. I, 5, 96-97, 116.
pp. I, 5, 8, 17, 53.
pp. I, 4-5, I0-II, 22, 53-54, 67, 93-96,
cit., pp. 313, 317.
Bohr, Atomic Theory etc., pp. 4, 5, 13, 57-61, II7.

Ibid.,
3 Ibid.,
4 Ibid.,
Dial., loco
2

119; Albert Einstein etc., pp. 224;
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will be ren1embered, is the law-like association in a continuous temporal
sequence of spatially organised bodies (or phenomena).
(vi) The function of mathematical theory is not merely to be an
«indispensable tool for describing quantitative relationships", like
essential means for the
Heisenberg's matrix mechanics, it is also
elucidation of the general qualitative points of view" 1, that is, it can
also be used to describe the two complementary viewpoints represented
by the wave and particle pictures.
(vii) The "reduction (or contraction) of the wave packet" which is the
name given to what takes place in an act of observation, is partly a
physical effect since it results from the physical union of subject and
object. It is partly a psychological effect in so far as the subject translates
this uniquely into a psychological act of observation:
translation
takes place according to the Principle of Psycho-physical Parallelism 2.
And it is partly a logical effect, since, as Feyerabend points out 3,
the subject switches suddenly from a wave-type or field-type de
scription to a particle-type description.
The way of complementarity then consists in "liberalising" our
classical concepts 4. This means knowing when to use a particle
representation and when to use a field or wave-like representation to
order our experiences. Every statement of fact in the quantum theory
is necessarily a statement in terms of classical concepts, that is, in
terms of the concepts of classical
physics and in terms of
the concepts of classical field physics. As Reichenbach has well said
of the duality of wave and particle:
and is not in the language
of physics, but in the metalanguage, that is in a language which speaks
about the language of physics. .. It does not refer to the physical
object but to possible descriptions of the physical object and thus falls
into the realm of the philosopher" 5.
The kind of physical theory based upon complementarity is called
by Bohr a «rational generalization of classical physics" 6. The
spondence Principle is, accordingly, a kind of
deduction
from the Principle of Complementarity 7.
1

Ibid., p. 8.
Ibid., pp. 24,

II8; ct.,
chap. IV.
Feyerabend, loco cit., p. 95.
4 Bohr, Atomic Theory etc., pp. 3, 5, IB, 63.
Hans Reichenbach, Rise of Scientific Philosophy, (Berkeley: Univ. of Cal. Press, 1962),
pp. 175- 176.
6 Bohr, Atomic Theory etc., pp. 4, 19,70,87,92, II0; Dial., lococit., p. 316; Albert Einstein
etc., pp. 210, 239.
7 Bohr, Atomic Theory etc., pp. 37, 70,
IIO; ct., infra, chap. VI.
2

3
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SECTION II: HEISENBERG AND COMPLEMENTARITY

Heisenberg and Complementarity
That his acceptance of complementarity made Heisenberg vaguely
uneasy at the beginning is suggested by the account he wrote in 1960,
and to which we have frequently referred 1. In this he goes out of his
way to note that he preferred a different approach to quantum me
chanics from Bohr's. Not only was there the question of discontinuities
in nature, but their viewpoints and casts of mind were different. Bohr's
approach to physics was empirical, and moved from the phenomena
to theory, which he considered to be a
from a lesser gener
alisation to a greater one; Heisenberg on the other hand took a more
intellectualistic approach to physics, moving from the potentialities
of theory to the testing of these in phenomena 2. Bohr could be classi
fied as empiricist and positivist in his metaphysics; while Heisenberg
on the othe.r hand was, and became increasingly with the lapse of time,
an idealist. Both, however, called themselves realists; but for different
reasons; Bohr because for him the reality of everyday life (and classical
physics) was the really real which he understood in an empiricist sense,
while Heisenberg called himself a realist because he never lost sight of the
transcendent obj ect which, though unknowable, was the noumenal corre
late of the phenomena. This difference in viewpoint showed up in their
different interpretations of the Indeterminacy Relations: as
put
it; Bohr affirmed the Unschiirte des Seins, while Heisenberg asserted me
rely the Unbestimmtheit der Voraussage 3. It was only because they could
agree in their interpretation of the phenomenal plane that Heisenberg
could with sincerity accept the premises of complementarity. However,
while complementarity constituted the whole horizon of Bohr's philoso
phy, it was really only an element -let us say, a premise - for the gradual
elaboration of Heisenberg's metaphysics. Instartingpoint,in problematic
and in systematic conclusions, Heisenberg played Kant to Bohr's Hume.
Wave-particle Duality in Heisenberg
In the Physical Principles ot the Quantum Theory, Heisenberg paid
tribute to the "conclusive studies of Bohr" and dedicated his work to
Heisenberg, Erinnerungen usw.
Heisenberg, Niels Bohr etc., pp. 12-29, especially p. I5.
3 A. Lande, "Dualismus, Wissenschaft und Hypothese", in Werner Heisenberg und die
Physik unserer Zeit, p. 124.
1

2
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the
of the Kopenhagener Geist der Quantentheorie . . . which
has directed the entire development of modern physics 1.
All our concepts, he says, are attempts to
and synthesise
results" 2 which are described in classical concepts, i.e., in the
of everyday life" 3. These concepts are idealisations in which
the gravitational constant and the reciprocal of the velocity of
light may be regarded as negligibly small" 4. They refer exclusively to
things of which we can form a picture in the imagination 5. All our
concepts, except mathematical concepts, are formed by inductive
generalisations of experience, but the limits of their applicability are
to be determined by reference to experience 6. Particle and wave
properties of both light and matter, which are intimately linked in
experiment, are too different to be simultaneous
of the same
thing. Hence, we are led to form
mental pictures-one of a particle
and the other of waves- both incomplete". They are complementary and
mutually exclusive aspects of atomic phenomena. Each has a limited
domain of applicability and neither must be pushed too far" 7. When we
speak, we refer to one or other of these pictures, but neither is a true visu
alisation of the atomic event. Atomic phenomena cannot be explained
as relations between objects existing in space and time 8. Conse
quently, our knowledge of events is an inextricable mixture of sub
jective and objective elements 9.
A traditional requirement of science has been a sharp division
between subject and object, i.e. between observer and observed 10. This
is possible in classical physics where the interaction between them is
negligible 11. In the atomic domain, however, the interaction can cause
('uncontrollable and large changes in the system observed" 12. The
union between the observer and the observed is such that it is im
possible to determine what part of a system belongs to one and what
part to the other 13. This leads to a certain inescapable indetermincay
in our knowledge of the simultaneous values of certain quantities,
1

2
3
4

5
6

7
8

9
10
11

12
13

Heisenberg's Preface to Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory.
Heisenberg, Physical Principles etc., p . 1.
Ibid., pp. 1-3.
Ibid., p. 2 .
Ibid., p. 11 .
Ibid., pp. 1, 11.
Ibid., pp. 10, 64, chaps. II and III.
Ibid ., pp. 63-64.
Ibid., p . 65 and passim.
Ibid., p. 2.
Ibid., p. 3.
Ibid., pp. 3, 64, 20-46.
Ibi d., pp. 58, 64, 67.
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which is expressed in the Indeterminacy Relations 1. This indetermi
nateness is attached to our knowledge of each individual microscopic
object 2. Our knowledge then of this class of objects is limited to
irreducible statistical distributions and correlations 3.

Causality in Heisenberg
The Principle of Causality expressed in the form "Natural phe
nomena obey exact laws" is to be renounced. Causality, he says, can
be defined only for an isolated system 4. No set of atomic systems, in
so far as they are the objects of observation-acts, obeys the law of
causality, since the act of observation disturbs them, and this dis
turbance precludes the exact geometrical description of each which is
a necessary condition for causality 5. The disturbance is due to the
sharing of ultimate and indivisible entities (viz., quanta of energy) 6.
The influence of the measuring device which brings about a discon
tinuous change in the system "is treated in a different manner from
the interaction of the various parts of the system"; these on the other
hand enter determinately and causally into the description 7. The
discontinuance change produced by an act of measurement is called the
"reduction of the wave packet". It is a physical effect since it effects
a change in the object 8. It is a psychological effect since it results in a
discontinuous change in our knowledge 9. It is a logical effect since it
results in a change of the mathematical representation of the physical
process from a wave to a particle picture
Heisenberg has reaffirmed all the propositions of this section and of
the preceding one many times since 1929, and he has given more detailed
and explicit treatment of some of the key ideas. For example in 1931,
he gave a conference to a group of physicists and philosophers in which
he described the crisis produced in the concept of causality and in the
Law of Causality by quantum mechanics. Most of the members of the
Ibid., pp. 13-46.
Ibid ., pp. 2,2 52.
3 Ibid., pp. 33-34, and passim.
4 Ibid., pp. 62 -63. Note that Heisenberg often uses the term "causality" in a wider sense
than Bohr, as referring to any determinate connection parametrised by time between
entities, whether these be mathematical, phenomenal or bodily entities.
5 Ibid ., pp. 58, 63 and passim.
6 Ibid., p. 63.
7 Ibid., p. 58. Note that this implies a perturbation theory of measurement, viz., that the
measured object is disturbed by the measurement and its true properties thereby obscured
by it.
S Ibid., p. 39 and passim.
9 Ibid ., p. 36 and passim.
10 Ibid., p. 36.
1

2
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group, like J. von Neumann, P. Frank and H. Reichenbach, belonged
to the Vienna Circle. The conference was published in Erkenntnis
under the title " Kausalgesetz und Quantentheorie" 1.
In this conference, Heisenberg examines five different formulations
of the Law of Causality and finds them either tautologous, not falsi
fiable or inhaltsleer. A formulation is tautologous if it merely analyses
the sense of the words without affirming the existence of a referent for
this sense. A non-falsifiable proposition is one whose referents, if there
are such, are inaccessible to human investigation. A concept is inhalts
leer if it has no referent, that is, if there is nothing in fact in which it is
verified. A law is inhaltsleer if it has no observable consequences 2. The
sense of inhaltsleer corresponds to the positivist notion of ohne Be
deutung (often translated by meaningless).
Heisenberg finds that the classical Law of Causality (viz., that
characteristic of classical physics) is inhaltsleer (presumably in atomic
physics only), since the conditions of applicability of its concepts and
hence of the law are never fulfilled. The classical law of causality can
be formulated:
an isolated system, if the present state of the
system is known in all its particulars, then the future state of the
system can be calculated". Heisenberg points
that an isolated
system is an unobserved system, since the act of observation would
result in a fusion of the system with a knowing subject, thus removing
its isolation as well as disturbing its original state. Moreover, since the
Uncertainty Principle does not permit exact knowledge of all the
variables of the initial state of the system, the conditions for the
fulfilment of the classical physical law of causality are never in
fulfilled. He considers the substitution of
in Hilbert space" (or
state of the system" and notes that
wave function") for the
the Schrödinger equation describes deterministically the time-change
of this ray (or wave function). This species of causality, he says, is not
real causality since the space of the wave function is configuration
the
space (i.e., an abstract theoretical3n-dimensional space where n
number of particles) and not the space of observable events 3. Ob
Heisenberg, Erkenntnis, loco cit.
Ibid., p . 173.
3 Heisenberg distinguishes between two kinds of waves: the "configuration space wave"
which is also the wave function of a many particle system, and the "probability wave" or
the "wave packet". The former is an ideal mathematical construction in a space of 3n
dimensions (ct., Physical
etc., Preface; Philosophic Problems etc., p. 1 5) . The
latter is the three-dimensional matter wave associated with the complementary particle
picture. Within the perspective of complementarity, the "probability wave" has as much
"reality" as the particle, i.e., both are equivalent ways of speaking about the same physical
object; ct., Niels
etc., p. 24; Physical
etc., p. 13.
1

2
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servable events are not connected causally, but – except in the case
of commuting operators – only statistically. Nor is there any escape
from indeterminism by including the observer (i.e. the eyes and the
other senses of the scientist as well as his instruments) within the
system in order to construct a more inclusive but isolated system of
which the observer is now a part; for this just leads to a more compre
hensivewave function which has in turn to be reduced to one of the
possibilities it contains by some super-act of observation. There is no
way, he concludes, of setting up or predicting a determinate chain of
observable events in quantum mechanics.
Of the Kantian expression of the Law of Causality, viz., that there
is a unique antecedent-consequent connection between objectifiable
events, Heisenberg concludes that it too is inhaltsleer, since atomic
events – because of the Indeterminacy Principle – cannot be ob
jectified in the Kantian sense. He compares the status of the Law of
Causality with the principles of Euclidean geometry. Both are syn
thetic a priori principles according to Kant. Since Einstein's relativity '
theory has shown that a gravitational field is characterised by a non
Euclidean geometry, we are justified in saying only that space is
Euclidean, if the conditions for the fulfilment Euclidean geome
try are fulfilled. This last is an a posteriori condition and might not
in fact be fulfilled, or might be fulfilled only in certain cases.
Similarly, with the Kantian Law of Causality, the conditions for its
application might not be fulfilled and are not in fact fulfilled in atomic
physics. Since Kant has shown that the Law of Causality is a necessary
condition for objective science, he concludes that quantum mechanics
is not objective. The objectivity in question is that attributed by Kant
to all empirical scientific objects. This is (what we have called)
phenomenal objectivity. The non-objectivity of a quantum system is
shown by the fact that it is known only to the extent that it interacts
with an observer-subject. Heisenberg concludes from this that modern
physics is not concerned with the essence and
of the atom
but with observable events. The emphasis is thus placed upon the
measurement process. He adds as an afterthought that, although the
Law of Causality is no longer universal, causality holds between
successive repetitions of a measurement since these give the same (or
neighbouring) values for the measured quantity.
During the course of the subsequent discussion, he asked whether,
in the reduction of the wave packet, the selection of one observed
value out of the many possible values is to be explained by the
..

- ---_ .....
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-
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physiology of the human observer. He replies that a photographic
plate can play the part of an observer equally well:
das ist noch
kein Zusammenhang zwischen der Physik und psychologischen
Fragen" 1. It is doubtful whether, given the later development of
measurement theory along the lines suggested by complementarity, he
would give the same answer to-day.
In a reply to von Neumann, he puts on record his opposition to any
way of speaking which would identify the wave function with the
Ding an sich. In the later development of his thought, he would affirm
a Ding an sich represented by the wave function, to which he would
give the name potentia or objektive Tendenz 2.
Heisenberg's View of Physics
Heisenberg's Principielle Fragen der M odernen Physik (1936) and his
Wandlungen in den Grundlagen der N aturwissenschaft (8th edition,
1949) which are collections of occasional lectures delivered between
1932 and 1948, restate without change or development the propositions
we have enunciated above 3. In these lectures, Heisenberg shows
himself interested in the historical and dialectical development of the
concept of nature from the Middle Ages up to the present day 4. He
sees himself justly in the line of those who helped to change man's
view of nature and, reflexively, his view of himself
nature.
We have pointed out that Heisenberg's approach to physics was
from the starting point of theory, Le., from the free creative un
inhibited search for mathematical theories a priori external empirical
experience. These played the part of Kant's pure science of nature, not
to the extent that they laid down absolute and necessary conditions
of possibility which every scientific object obeys, but to the extent
that they served to define conditions of possibility for possible scientific
objects. A theory which is inhaltsleer is distinguished from one which
has observable consequences by having recourse to empirical tests 5.
He held that neither the forms of thought, nor experience itself imposed
on us a unique a priori or pure science of nature. The
value and the limits of applicability of each theory were to be de
Ibid., p. 184.
2 See intra, chap. VIII, pp. 150-152.

1

3 These two volumes have been translated into English and appear together under the
title: Philosophic Problems of Nuclear Physics (London: Faber and Faber, 1952).
4 Ibid., pp. 12-13; also W. Heisenberg, "Der Begriff 'Abgeschlossene Theorie' in der
modernen Naturwissenschaft", Dialectica, II, 7/8 (1948), pp. 331-336.
5 Heisenberg, Physical Principles etc., p. 15.
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termined a posteriori by experimental investigation 1. In this respect,
he abandoned both the rationalisitc intentionality-structure of classical
physics, and the rigid set of synthetic a priori principles which Kant
alleged were necessarily operative in the construction of every scientific
object. A theory verified within a limited domain was given the name
"abgeschlossene Theorie" (a Closed or Complete Theory) 2. Heisenberg
gave four examples: (a) Newtonian Mechanics, (b) Maxwell's electro
magnetic theory, (c) heat and statistical mechanics, and (d) the
quantum theory with chemistry annexed. We shall return to the notion
of a Closed (or Complete) Theory later on.
In a paper entitled W ahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen in der Quanten
theorie der Wellenfelder (1938) 3, Heisenberg again reiterates his view
that the
of measurement disturbs the object
thereby sets limits
to our knowledge; that such knowledge as we are capable of, is pene
trated with an inescapable (private) subjectivity; and that, conse
quent on the inter-penetration of subject and object in physics, the
laws of atomic physics are irreducibly probabilistic.
This account brings us approximately up to the year 1950. As the
subsequent development of his philosophy concerned principally the
ontology of nature, we shall postpone the consideration of his later
works of philosophical interest to Part II. We shall summarise below
some of the principles and conclusions of Heisenberg's philosophy with
regard to scientific method and the structure of knowledge. Our
criticism of these will occupy the next
chapters.

SECTION III:
THE

INTENTIONALITY

STRUCTURE

OF

COMPLEMENTARITY

Complementarity in its original form contains two key ideas on
scientific method and three basic propositions in philosophy. The two
sets of ideas are intimately related and constitute a logical whole which
we might call the intentionality-structure of complementarity in its
early phase.
The key propositions on scientific method are the following:
(r) The definition of variables can only be made with the aid of
classical physical concepts. These are identical- except for refinements
1
2
3

Heisenberg, Philosophic Problems etc., p. 23; and Zeit. f. Physik, XLIII (1927), p. 172.
Heisenberg, Philosophic Problems etc., p. 24; and Dial., loco cit., pp. 331-336.
W. Heisenberg, "Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen in der Quantentheorie der Wellenfelder",
scientifiques et industrielles, No. 734 (Paris: Hermann, 1938).
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with the concepts of everyday life; (2) The act of measurement
perturbs the object. Its objective state ("objective" that is, "not
affected by the subjectivity of purely private experience") cannot be
known – whether as an object of empirical science (a phenomenal
object) or as a reality (an object in the strict or formal sense). The
Indeterminacy Principle expresses the degree of this perturbation, and,
at the same time, traces the limits of our power of knowing physical
objects. We call this the perturbation theory of measurement.
Three basic philosophical propositions are linked with these 1.
(I) It is impossible for us to know atomic events in their transcendent
noumenal reality or in an objectifiable phenomenal reality, since the
resources of our knowing powers are limited to manipulating and
synthesising phenomenal representations. Two kinds of phenomenal
representations are available to us, wave representations and particle
representations, and out of these our knowledge of atomic systems has
to be constructed. The resulting construction lacks
formal (or
strict) objectivity and empirical objectivity. (2) Causality (viz., the
strict temporal antecedent-consequent link between bodies or phe
nomena) fails in atomic physics and for this reason atomic systems are
not empirically objectifiable, and for the same reason the statistical
laws of quantum physics are irreducible. (3) The only knowledge
which has a right to be called objective knowledge of physical reality is
an observation-event: this is the perception of an everyday event
occurring in (three-demensional) space and ordinary time. With regard
to atomic systems, our knowledge is not objective – even in the sense
of public objectivity. We know such systems only in an observation
event which is the indissoluble union of observer
and observed
(object) and to such knowledge is attached an irreducible element of the
subjectivity of private experience. Quantum mechanics may be said to
have a public instrumental value or public objectivity only for the pur
pose of (statistical) prediction or technical use. As far as individual sys
tems are concerned, our knowledge falls short even of public objectivity.
Summary

The return to the concrete and empirical implied in Heisenberg's
insight on the importance of observables in physics was not, however,
1 The philosophical propositions outlined below belong to a phase which lasted in H eisen
berg's c ase up to approximately 1950. After that, the predominantly rationalist and Kantian
bent of his mind separated him more and more from Bohr and the empiricist wing of the
Cope nhagen School. A comparison will be made in P a rt II be t ween H eise nber g's early a nd
late philosophy.
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in Heisenberg's case, accompanied by a thorough re-thinking of the
rationalist presuppositions of classical physics. The effect on Bohr,
however, was to lead him to a complete rejection of rationalism and to
the adoption of the contrary extreme, empiricism. The profound –
though largely implicit – cause of the disagreement between Bohr and
Heisenberg as to the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics, was
resolved in the sumnler of 1927, by the common acceptance of the
philosophy of complementarity. This was based upon the acceptance
of wave mechanics – though not of Schrödinger's interpretation of it –
as an equally valid part of the quantum theory with matrix mechanics.
A corollary of this was agreement about the complete equivalence of
wave and particle representations of quantum phenomena. The latter
was called wave-particle dualism or the Principle of Complementarity.
The common acceptance of complementarity resulted in agreement as
to the language in which quantum phenomena were to be described.
In this chapter, we stated the essential propositions of the philosophy
of complementarity concerning the nature and limits of human
knowing, scientific method and the ontology of nature.

